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Decided on August 10, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County
Blanca Mendoza, Petitioner,
against
7478 Post Avenue Heights Assoc. LLC
SANTOS SANTANA, GEORGE HUANG,
Respondents,
NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development
Corespondent.

Index No. 30057522
Manhattan Legal Services (Leila James, Esq. and Rebecca Whedon, Esq.), for the petitioner
SDK Heiberger, LLP (Eric Kahan, Esq.), for the respondent
Karen May Bacdayan, J.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
This is a housing part proceeding commenced by petitioner against respondent after she
was vacated, pursuant to a vacate order issued by the Department of Housing Preservation
and Development ("HPD" or "the department"), from her apartment for a second time when a
second devastating fire tore through the subject building less than a year after the first.

Petitioner, her husband, and seven children have been relocated by from the premises to a
temporary shelter at the department's expense. Petitioner seeks an order to correct, civil
penalties, and an order requiring the respondentlandlord to pay the costs and expenses of
relocating petitioner to temporary housing that is more appropriate for her family than the
city shelter system.
Respondents have moved to dismiss petitioner's request that the court order respondents
to pay relocation costs and expenses. Respondents argue that there is no statutory basis to
require a landlord to pay for relocation costs, that case law does not support such an order,
and that it is not within this court's equitable jurisdiction as conferred by the New York City
Civil Court Act ("CCA") 110 (c) to require respondents to pay for more appropriate housing
when HPD has already relocated petitioner as required by law.
Respondents Huang and Santana have moved to have petitioner's claim for civil
penalties as against them dismissed. Respondent, George Huang, is an officer of the building
registered with HPD, and respondent, Santos Santana, is no longer registered as the
managing agent as of July 2022, though it is not disputed that he was the registered managing
agent at the time this proceeding was commenced.
Petitioner acknowledges that there are no cases that require a landlord to pay for
[*2]relocation costs (NYSCEF Doc No. 14, petitioner's attorney's affirmation in opposition ¶
40), but argues that the court has the equitable power under New York City Civil Court Act
110 to require the landlord to do so under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Respondent cites to a handful of cases for this proposition which petitioner distinguishes in
opposition.
After oral argument held on July 26, 2022 and August 2, 2022, for the following reasons
the court finds that the Housing Court is without jurisdiction as a matter of law or equity to
order a landlord to pay for relocations costs when a lawful occupant is displaced by a vacate
order.
DISCUSSION
Relocation Costs — Cause of Action
NY City Housing Maintenance Code [Administrative Code of the City of NY] § 26301
(1) (a) (v) states in relevant part:

"The commissioner of housing preservation and development shall have the power
and it shall be his or her duty: (a) To provide and maintain tenant relocation
services . . . (v) for tenants of any privately owned building where such tenants
vacate such building during a period when any law, regulation, order or
requirement pertaining to the maintenance or operation of such building or the
health, safety and welfare of its occupants requires such occupants to vacate such
building. . . . Such services may be provided as such commissioner may deem
necessary, useful or appropriate for the relocation of such tenants (emphases
added)."
NY City Housing Maintenance Code § 26303 establishes a relocation advisory
commission: "There shall be a relocation advisory commission composed of fifteen
members, who shall be appointed by the mayor."
NY City Housing Maintenance Code § 26304 outlines the relocation advisory
commission's powers and duties.
"The relocation advisory commission shall meet at least once a month. It shall be
informed by the commissioner of housing preservation and development of, and
advise him or her on, matters of procedure and policy with respect to the relocation
of tenants of real property over which the department has relocation jurisdiction."
Finally, NY City Housing Maintenance Code § 26305 (1) provides that HPD shall seek
reimbursement from the owner for relocation costs expended by HPD:
". . . [T]he department shall be entitled to reimbursement of such expenses from
the owner of the building from which such tenants were relocated, if the conditions
giving rise to the need for such relocation arose as a result of the negligent or
intentional acts of such owner, or as a result of the failure of such owner to
maintain or repair such building in accordance with the standards prescribed by the
housing maintenance code, building code, health code, or any other applicable law
governing such building. The department shall recover such expenses from such
owner (emphases added)."
There is no specific provision in the NY City Housing Maintenance Code ("HMC")
allowing for a tenant to seek reimbursement from the landlord for relocation costs after being
displaced by a vacate order. Rather the above cited sections place the "duty" on HPD to
provide what it determines to be "necessary, useful, appropriate" relocation services (HMC §
26301); [*3]and HMC § 26305 provides that HPD shall seek reimbursement from the
landlord if it is determined that the vacate order was caused by the landlord's negligence.
Thus, the landlord's duty, in turn, is to reimburse HPD if HPD can prove the landlord was at
fault. (HMC § 26305 [1].)

There is one Appellate Term First Department and two decisions from a court of
concurrent jurisdiction that are most often cited for the proposition that a tenant may seek a
court order requiring a landlord to pay relocation costs in the context of a vacate order.
In Farber v 535 E. 86th St. Corp., 2002 WL 317987, *1 (2002), the Appellate Term,
First Department vacated that part of a trial court's order directing the landlord to pay the
"reasonable costs" of relocating cooperative shareholders while repairs were made in their
apartment. The court "[did] not find preponderant evidence that such relocation was
required." (Id. *1.) Where there is a vacate order, it is manifest that relocation is required;
and, here, relocation has been provided as required by HPD. It is not clear from the Farber
court's decision that the court found a cause of action in the HMC for a tenant to seek
relocation costs directly from the landlord. It is only by implication and extension that courts
have so found.
There are two cases from courts of concurrent jurisdiction that stand for the proposition
that "[CCA 110 (c)] provides the authority for the [h]ousing [p]art to award relocation
expenses in promoting the public interest." The first is Gonzalez v Kwik Realty LLC, 42 Misc
3d 433, 437 (Civ Ct, New York County 2013). The Gonzalez court specifically found that a
request for relocation expenses is a "proper cause of action against [a landlord]" provided by
CCA 110 (c), though, again, the record does not demonstrate that relocation costs were
actually awarded as against the landlord.
Two years later, the same court issued Revilla v 620 West 182nd Street Height Assoc.
LLC, 47 Misc 3d 1211 (A), 2015 NY Slip Op 50556 (U) (Civ Ct, New York County 2015). In
Revilla the court held that "[i]t is clear that landlords are held accountable for tenant
relocation services pursuant to a vacate order under the Administrative Code of the City of
New York §§ 26301(1) (a) (v), 26305." It is not as clear to this court that such is the case.
Moreover, the Revilla court did not actually award relocation expenses, although the parties
may have settled upon them.
Citing to three cases — Altz v Lieberson, 233 NY 16 (1922), Farber, and Gonzalez —
the Revilla court found that the need for relocation arose out of the landlord's failure to
maintain the building in compliance with the HMC; thus, the court found that tenants have a
viable claim against a landlord for relocation costs when displaced by a vacate order. For the
following reasons, this court, most respectfully, takes a different view.
The Revilla court's reliance on Altz is misplaced. Altz involved the issue of whether a
tenant had a cause of action against their landlord to maintain the premises which they

occupied. The Court held that a tenant had the right to a habitable premises, and that the right
to seek redress for an injury sustained by a falling ceiling within a tenant's own apartment
was not restricted to the city or its officers under the Tenement House Law, which limited a
tenant's cause of action against a landlord to violations in common areas. The Altz court
found that the Tenement House Law had to be interpreted to extend to include relief for a
tenement tenant to seek redress from a landlord for necessary repairs inside their residence,
thus portending the warranty of habitability, which is implied in every written or oral lease.
(See Real Property Law § 235b; Dan M. Blumenthal, 2021 Supp Practice Commentary,
McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, RPL 235b [warranty of habitability] [Note: online version]
["In 1922, Justice Benjamin [*4]Cardozo, then of the New York Court of Appeals,
interpreted the [then] newlyenacted Tenement House Law and concluded that "the
Legislature must have known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor were made by the
landlord, they would not be made by any one"].)
Recently, in Sanjurjo v Milio, 70 Misc 3d 1224 [A], NY Slip Op 50208 [U] [Civ Ct,
Bronx County 2022] the court stated, "[w]hether relocation costs are sufficiently tethered to
'housing standards' is debatable" and the court dismissed petitioner's claim for relocation
costs as against the landlord after a vacate order absent allegations of fault in the petition.
(*8.)
In Baer v 400 S. 2nd St. Realties, LP, 71 Misc 3d 1125 (Civ Ct, Kings County 2021), the
court analyzed whether the HMC created a cause of action for interim multiple dwelling
tenants to sue in housing court. In finding that it did not, the court stated:
"As has been observed repeatedly, the Housing Part of the Civil Court of the City
of New York was created in 1972 with the purpose to hear 'actions and
proceedings involving the enforcement of state and local laws for the
establishment and maintenance of housing standards' (NY City Civ Ct Act § 110
[a]; Prometheus Realty Corp. v City of New York, 80 AD3d 206, 209 [1st Dept
2010]). However, while CCA 110 created the court and gave it subject matter
jurisdiction to hear various actions and proceedings, it did not create any causes of
action for any actions or proceedings." (Id. at 1127.)
Notably, MDL 282a (2) was amended effective December 1, 2021 to specifically add a
cause of action for loft tenants to enforce housing standards. L 2021, c 639, § 1, thus putting
that issue to rest.
CCA 110 (c) gives the housing court subject matter jurisdiction to hear "[p]roceedings
for the issuance of injunctions and restraining orders or other orders for the enforcement of

housing standards under such laws" and "[a]ctions and proceedings for the removal of
housing violations recorded pursuant to such laws, or for the imposition of such violation or
for the stay of any penalty thereunder (emphases added)." (CCA 110 [c] [4], [7].) It is the
HMC that supplies the cause of action for HPD or a lawful occupant to seek an order of
correction to enforce housing standards. And it is the HMC that provides the cause of action
for HPD or a lawful occupant to seek imposition of violations and penalties for the failure to
correct such violations. (See NYC Admin Code § 272115.) The HMC does not provide that
a tenant may seek redress from a landlord for relocation costs incurred due to a vacate order.
It must be noted that, distinct from the HMC provision that requires HPD to relocate
tenants during a vacate order at HPD's expense, is the requirement that the landlord pay for
relocation costs during remediation of a lead paint violation if the work "cannot be done
safely." (HMC § 27—2056.1 [a] [1].) "[The rules] provide for temporary relocation provided
by the owner of the occupants of a dwelling or dwelling unit to appropriate housing when
work cannot be performed safely (emphasis added)." (Id.) If the drafters of the code wished
to specifically place the same duty upon owners under vacate order circumstances, it could
have drafted that language or amended the law. "It is a general rule of construction that
omissions in a statute, where the act is clear and explicit in its language, cannot be supplied
by construction. A court should not attempt to fill up or cure a casus omissus by supplying
what it thinks should have been put there by the lawmakers." (E. Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n,
Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 79 AD2d 516, 517 [1st Dept 1980].) Moreover, ". . . the failure
of the Legislature to include a substantive, significant prescription in a statute is a strong
indication that its exclusion was intended." (People v Finnegan, 85 NY2d 53, 58 [1995].)
This court finds that there is no cause of action in the HMC allowing for a tenant to seek
relocation costs directly from the landlord when a tenant is displaced by a vacate order.
This determination is supported by Cupidon v Donovan, 8 Misc 3d 1024 (A), 2005 NY
Slip Op 51263 (U) (Sup Ct, New York County 2005). In Cupidon, HPD rendered an
unwritten decision that petitioner, a tenant of an illegal basement apartment, was not entitled
to be relocated by HPD to temporary shelter after the issuance of a vacate order. The tenant
brought an Article 78 proceeding to challenge HPD's determination. The Supreme Court
annulled HPD's oral determination as violating the plain language of statute and remitted to
HPD to "provide petitioner with any and all services and assistance it determines to be
appropriate and required to be provided to a 'relocatee' pursuant to applicable statute and
regulation." (Id. 2005 NY Slip O. 51263(U), *4). The Cupidon court based its holding on the
plain language of the statute, and concluded that, as it was not disputed that Keith Cupidon

was a rent paying tenant who was a permanent resident of the premises as defined by HMC §
272004 8 (a), he fell under the umbra of displaced persons entitled to relocation when
displaced by a vacate order. Cupidon does not stand for the proposition, for which it has
sometimes been cited, that a tenant who is displaced by a vacate order is entitled to be
relocated by an owner at the owner's expense. Cupidon does, however, stand for the
proposition that HPD is the party responsible for relocating tenants and permanent residents
displaced by a vacate order as "necessary, useful, and appropriate." (HMC § 26301 [1] [a]
[v].)
The Court's Equitable Jurisdiction to Award Relocation Costs
Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding that there is no specific provision in the HMC
and, admittedly, no controlling case law that requires a landlord to pay for relocation costs
when a lawful occupant is displaced by a vacate order, this court has "broad" equitable
powers under CCA 110 (c) "to craft any remedy, procedure, or sanction it deems necessary to
preserve and enforce housing standards and promote the public interest." (NYCEF Doc No.
24, petitioner's attorney's affirmation ¶¶ 2930.) Petitioner maintains that, while no court has
actually required an owner to pay for relocation costs, there are courts that have declined to
foreclose the possibility of litigating this claim "in an appropriate case" based on their
equitable power under CCA 110. Stating that "petitioner and her seven children, three of
whom have disabilities, have twice been forced into cramped shelter quarters, greatly
restricting their privacy, autonomy, and dignity," petitioner urges that the facts and
circumstances of this proceeding suggest that this petitioner's situation presents an
appropriate case. (Id. ¶ 33.)
However, the equitable jurisdiction and injunctive powers of the housing court are not
unlimited. As the Appellate Term cautioned in Broome Realty Associates v Sek Wing Eng
(182 Misc 2d 917 (App Term, 1st Dept 1999) when it reversed the lower court, "Civil Court's
injunctive authority is limited to applications for certain provisional remedies and
proceedings for the enforcement of housing standards. . . ." Since the enforcement of housing
standards was not at issue in that case "the limited injunctive authority of the Civil Court did
not extend to the matter in dispute." (Id. at 917.)
Nowhere in the code is the term "housing standards" defined. None of the cases cited by
petitioner find that relocation is related to housing standards, only that the court has broad
equitable powers which may be exercised in certain situations, even though in none of those
cases did a judge find the equities to rise to the level of exercising their equitable powers to

[*5]actually enjoin the landlord to pay relocation costs.
The most relevant authority regarding the definition of housing standards is provided by
Prometheus Realty Corp. v City of New York, 80 AD3d 206 (1st Dept 2010). The Prometheus
court found that the 2007 city council amendment of the HMC to include a cause of action
for harassment did not run afoul of the court's jurisdiction under CCA 110 (c) because it
relates to housing standards. In so finding, the Prometheus court opined: "It is demonstrably
untrue that the Housing Maintenance Code has been, until now, strictly limited to governing
matters of building structure. Initially, as the motion court observed, the legislative
declaration in the Housing Maintenance Code indicates an intent to protect tenants' "actual
occupancy," as well as the physical condition of the premises, in that it explicitly declares a
need to protect tenants in areas of "health and safety, fire protection, light and ventilation,
cleanliness, repair and maintenance, and occupancy in dwellings." (Id. at 212.) The
harassment provisions of the HMC survived the challenge mounted by Prometheus Realty
because the court found harassment relates to housing standards, in the same way that a
nuisance does, and the right to peaceful "occupancy" in a tenant's own home.[FN1] "Since
such issues as whether a tenant's conduct is objectionable or constitutes a nuisance have
already been established to be within the jurisdiction of the Housing Part, and therefore
necessarily an issue of 'housing standards,' the equivalent issue of whether a particular
landlord's conduct constitutes harassment must similarly be recognized as an issue of
'housing standards' . . . ." (Id.)
One court recently determined that awarding relocation expenses against a landlord
might be within the equitable jurisdiction of the court if it can be proven at trial that the
landlord is at fault. (Cardenas v 7478 Post Avenue Heights Associates LLC, 2022 WL
2209966, *1 [Civ Ct, New York County 2022].) [FN2] The court stated that it found the
holding in Sanjurjo, 2021 NY Slip Op 50208 (U) to be persuasive, and while the court agrees
with Sanjurjo that "[Housing Court] should, in most circumstances, avoid interfering in [the
statutory] scheme [provided in the HMC]," like the Sanjurjo court and the other courts of
concurrent jurisdiction, supra, the Cardenas court declined to "rule out an award of
relocation expenses against the landlord on equitable grounds, based on a finding of fault."
(Cardenas *1.) However, this court also respectfully disagrees that, even if the tenant alleges
that a landlord has been negligent, the element of fault creates equitable grounds to enjoin a
landlord to pay relocation costs. This court has already found that relocation under vacate
order circumstances is not sufficiently related to housing standards such as to invoke this
court's equitable jurisdiction.[FN3] The Cardenas court did [*6]not specifically address the

issue of whether relocation to temporary shelter involves housing standards. And the
Sanjurjo court recognized that "[w]hether relocation costs are sufficiently tethered to
'housing standards' is debatable." (NY Slip Op 50208 [U], *8].)[FN4]
Generally, a tenant has a right to reoccupy their apartment after a vacate order is issued,
but the enforcement mechanisms extant in the HMC are a Housing Part action seeking an
order to correct the HMC violations underlying the vacate order, a Housing Part action
seeking an award of civil penalties for failure to timely abate those violations, and a motion
for contempt for failing to remediate, as required by a court order in that action, the
conditions that caused the vacate order. Notably missing from petitioner's recitation of CCA
110 (c) in support of her argument that the court has equitable power to award relocation
costs is that this court may recommend or employ any remedy, program, procedure or
sanction "authorized by law." To require a landlord to pay relocation costs as a matter of
equity would be remedy or sanction not within the Housing Court's jurisdiction to enforce
housing standards. The legislature could amend the statute to provide such a cause of action
against the landlord, and it would remain to be seen if, upon a challenge, as in Prometheus,
the legislature would find that cause of action rationally related to housing standards.
Finally, to the very limited extent that respondent argues in one paragraph of her
attorney's affirmation that ordering relocation costs would promote the public interest, this
court does not interpret the words "public interest" as broadly as petitioner urges it should be
read. (NYSCEF Doc No. 24 ¶ 30 ["This authority is broad and stems from the Court's ability
to craft any remedy, procedure, or sanction it deems necessary to preserve and enforce
housing standards and promote the public interest (emphasis as in original)"].) The court
does not have unmitigated injunctive power to promote the public interest in all things.
Rather, the court has the ability to employ any remedy that the court believes will further
compliance with housing standards, or promote the public interest in the enforcement of
housing standards. Certainly, it would be in petitioner's best interests for her and her family
to be housed somewhere other than a city shelter. However, petitioner's best interests are not
paramount to the public interest.
Even so, petitioner is not without a remedy. If petitioner believes that HPD is breaching
its duty to provide necessary and appropriate temporary shelter in this situation, she may
appeal HPD's determination in an Article 78 proceeding. (See Cupidon, 2005 NY Slip Op
51263 [U], supra.) If the appellate court agrees with petitioner that HPD must provide
alternate housing at its expense, then HPD may seek reimbursement from respondent, and,
upon service of a notice of those charges, petitioner may challenge HPD's request for

reimbursement on the basis that respondent is not at fault for causing the vacate order.
If this result is undesirable, it is for the legislature to remedy. (Chazon LLC v
Maugenest, 19 NY3d 410, 416 [2012].)
Respondent's Motion to dismiss Petitioner's Request for Civil Penalties
HMC 272004 (a) (5) states: "The term 'person' shall include the owner or owners of the
freehold of the premises or lesser estate therein, a mortgagee or vendee in possession,
assignee [*7]of rents, receiver, executor, trustee, lessee, agent, or any other person, firm or
corporation, directly or indirectly in control of a dwelling." See also HMC 272004 (45)
[defining "owner" in the same way].)
There is no basis to dismiss civil penalties as against the named individuals. In fact,
there is nothing preventing respondent from seeking civil penalties before an order to correct
is issued. HMC 272115 (h) provides that ". . . if there is a notice of violation outstanding
respecting the premises in which the tenant or group of tenants resides . . . the tenant or any
group of tenants, may individually or jointly apply to the housing part for an order directing
the owner and the department to appear before the court. . . . If the court finds a condition
constituting a violation exists, it shall direct the owner to correct the violation and, upon
failure to do so within the time set for certifying the correction of such violation pursuant to
subdivision (c) of this section, it shall impose a penalty in accordance with subdivision (a) of
this section (emphasis added)."
However, to do so without an order to correct issued by the court directing the owner to
lift violations within a statutorily prescribed time period and directive service of the order,
petitioner would have to demonstrate proper service by HPD of proper notices of violation as
defined by the code. To do that, petitioner would have to subpoena HPD for records
pertaining to the notices of violation issued by HPD, their propriety, and service thereof
pursuant to HMC272115 (b) and (c). Because of the time and expense of holding a hearing
regarding whether a proper notice of violation was properly served, most petitioners opt to
seek from the court an order to correct for which there are few defenses.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's request that the court direct
respondent to pay for the costs and expenses of relocating petitioner to alternative, more
appropriate housing is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's claim for civil penalties
against Huang and Santana is DENIED.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.
Dated: August 10, 2022
New York, NY

HON. KAREN MAY BACDAYAN
Judge, Housing Part

Footnotes

Footnote 1 :Apropos this court's holding above, that there is no cause of action in the HMC
against a landlord for relocation costs, the Prometheus court also recognized that the Housing
Part is authorized to enforce laws related to housing standards, but that there must be a law
- a cause of action-to enforce. The Prometheus court expounded, "For example, the
Housing Part is authorized under [RPL] § 235-b (1) to determine whether tenants are being
subjected to conditions detrimental to their life, health or safety ... [and] [t]he Housing Part
is authorized under RPAPL 711 to determine whether a tenant is objectionable so as to entitle
the landlord to terminate the lease ... " (80 AD3d at 210, 211).
Footnote 2:Cardenas, currently on appeal, involves the same petitioner herein, and a
decision on the same motion to dismiss on the same grounds.
Footnote 3 :Nor can this court infer the element of fault to create a cause of action. (E.
Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n, Inc., at 517, supra.) The issue of fault only arises when HPD seeks
reimbursement from the landlord for the expenses that HPD incurs in providing temporary
shelter to tenants displaced by a vacate order. (HMC § 26-305 [1].)
Footnote 4:Sanjurjo, 2021 NY Slip Op 50208 (U) *l, also holding that absent allegations of
fault, the court is without jurisdiction to award relocation costs and dismissing petitioner's
claim for same.
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